The Political Duopoly: Antitrust Applicability to Political Parties and the Commission on Presidential Debates by Toth, Samuel F.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 64 | Issue 1
2013
The Political Duopoly: Antitrust Applicability to
Political Parties and the Commission on
Presidential Debates
Samuel F. Toth
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Samuel F. Toth, The Political Duopoly: Antitrust Applicability to Political Parties and the Commission on Presidential Debates, 64 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 239 (2013)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol64/iss1/14
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 1·2013 
239 
—  Note  — 
The Political Duopoly: 
Antitrust Applicability to 
Political Parties and the 
Commission on Presidential 
Debates 
“[S]ooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able 
or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to 
the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty.”1 
“The League of Women Voters is withdrawing its sponsorship of 
the presidential debate scheduled for mid-October because the 
demands of the two campaign organizations would perpetrate 
fraud on the American voter.”2 
Abstract 
The Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD) has created a 
catch-22 for third-party candidates. To be eligible for its debates, the 
CPD requires candidates to show a 15% level of national support. But 
third-party candidates cannot reach this threshold without first 
participating in the CPD’s debates. As a result, the 15% requirement 
deprives third-party candidates of a meaningful opportunity to 
compete against their major-party opponents.  
In 2012, third-party candidate Gary Johnson sued the CPD under 
the theory that its selection criteria violate antitrust laws. This Note 
explores the viability of this novel legal theory. Although the Supreme 
Court has usually barred antitrust application within the political 
arena, Johnson’s claim is distinguishable and possibly meets the 
elements of a section 1 violation of the Sherman Act. Further, this 
Note discusses the public-policy benefits of third-party inclusion and 
considers less restrictive, alternative criteria that would still satisfy 
the proffered justifications of the 15% requirement. 
  
 
1.  George Washington, The Address of General Washington to the People 
of the United States on his Declining of the Presidency of the United 
States (Sept. 19, 1796). 
2.  Press Release, League of Women Voters, League Refuses to “Help 
Perpetrate a Fraud” (Oct. 3, 1988), [hereinafter League], available at 
http://www.lwv.org/press-releases/league-refuses-help-perpetrate-fraud. 
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Introduction 
Just two days before the 2012 election, the U.S. presidential 
candidates decided to hold another debate. Unlike the previous 
debates, the candidates sparred at length over the contentious issues 
of reforming immigration, fixing campaign finance, and combatting 
climate change. But also unlike the previous debates, millions of 
voters were not watching. It took place in the back of a coffeehouse.3  
 
3. Annie Lowrey, Another Presidential Debate, But This Time the 
Candidates Are Much Less Familiar, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 2012, at A12. 
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Gary Johnson, Jill Stein, Virgil Goode, and Rocky Anderson—all 
third-party candidates—held this last minute debate to highlight 
some issues of widespread interest that were largely avoided in the 
major-party debates.4 Historically, a key value of third-party 
candidates has been to popularize issues of voter concern that would 
otherwise be ignored by the major parties.5 However, these third-
party candidates do not run solely for such altruistic purposes. They 
want to win. And in today’s political landscape, participation in the 
debates sponsored by the Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD) 
would be essential to a third-party victory.6  
But third-party candidates are essentially excluded from this 
opportunity. The CPD restricts its invitations to candidates who are 
(1) constitutionally eligible, (2) on enough state ballots to possess a 
theoretical chance of winning the Electoral College, and (3) able to 
show at least a 15% level of support in national public opinion polls.7 
This last requirement has created a catch-22 for third-party 
candidates. In order to access the debates, the candidate must first 
gain popularity; but in order to gain popularity, the candidate must 
first establish viability by participating in the debates.8 
Realizing this dilemma, third-party candidates seek relief through 
the courts every election season. The plaintiffs have sued the CPD 
and previous staging organizations for inclusion in the debates under 
an array of legal theories. Despite this persistence, no third party has 
successfully sued for inclusion; more often than not, courts have been 
bound by deference to agency interpretations.9 Possibly in an attempt 
to avoid this, Libertarian candidate Gary Johnson sued the CPD 
under a new theory, novel in its application in this field: antitrust 
law.10  
4. Press Release, Ralph Nader to Host Third-Party Presidential Debate in 
D.C. Nov. 4 (Nov. 1, 2012), available at http://nader.org/2012/11/01/
ralph-nader-to-host-third-party-presidential-debate-in-d-c-114/.  
5. Steven J. Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America 221 
(2d ed. 1996). 
6. See Theresa Amato, Grand Illusion 224–25 (2009) (noting that 
the debates are essential to candidate viability and that the publicity 
benefits from participation are irreplaceable). 
7. See 2012 Candidate Selection Criteria, Commission on Presidential 
Debates, http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=candidate-selection-
process [hereinafter 2012 Criteria]. 
8. Ted G. Jelen, The Perot Campaigns in Theoretical Perspective, in Ross 
for Boss 1, 4 (Ted G. Jelen ed., 2001). 
9. See, e.g., Buchanan v. FEC, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58, 74 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(noting the “substantial deference” the court had to give an FEC 
interpretation of its own regulation). 
10. Complaint, Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 8:2012cv01600 
(filed Sept. 21, 2012). 
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This Note explores whether antitrust law can or should be applied 
to the CPD and its 15% polling requirement for participation. Part I 
provides a background on the initial legal hurdles involved in allowing 
political debates to even be broadcast. Part I also discusses the 
history and origins of the staging organizations, the selection criteria 
used by staging organizations, and the claims brought by third-party 
candidates challenging the selection criteria.  
Part II identifies two obstacles third-party candidates would face 
suing under antitrust law and advances a possible distinction between 
a third-party candidate’s suit and the “political activity” exemption. 
While recognizing counter arguments, Part III attempts to 
demonstrate that the CPD’s exclusion of third-party candidates could 
possibly violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.11 It discusses the 
challenges presented with applying the Act—notably that the novel 
theory, without direct precedent, stands on imperfect analogies. 
Part III also attempts to distinguish Sheppard v. Lee,12 which 
addressed a similar issue. Lastly, this Part suggests a number of 
alternatives to the 15% requirement. These alternate standards 
represent possible compromises that would make access to this 
essential resource reasonable and feasible while adhering to the 
proffered justifications for exclusionary rules. 
Part IV argues that if a court finds it could apply antitrust within 
its discretion, the court should apply this law. It explains how public 
policy would benefit from third-party inclusion and how this would 
align with the broader purposes of antitrust law. While the debates 
are a part of the political process, they are also the manifestation of a 
competitive enterprise. And the Sherman Act’s goal of maintaining a 
level playing field in competitive arenas compels a more lenient policy 
of access to the debates. 
I. Background of Televised Debates  
A. Development and Issues of Broadcast Debates 
Political debates have long been subject to controversy and 
criticism. The initial legal issues involved the ability to broadcast a 
debate.13 When the Communications Act of 193414 was enacted, 
 
11. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
12. 929 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1991). 
13. Newton N. Minow & Craig L. LaMay, Inside the Presidential 
Debates: Their Improbable Past and Promising Future 29 
(2008). It should be noted that Newton N. Minow is a former chairman 
of the Federal Communications Commission, and is currently Vice 
Chairman of the Commission on Presidential Debates. Id. at ix–x. 
14. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 47 U.S.C. (2006)). 
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section 315 regulated public office candidates’ use of a broadcasting 
station.15 This section came to be known as the “equal opportunity” 
or “equal time” rule.16 This rule stated that any broadcaster giving or 
selling airtime to one candidate in any political race must provide the 
same opportunity to all other “legally qualified candidate[s]” running 
for the same office.17  
The equal time rule mirrored section 18 of its predecessor, the 
1927 Radio Act.18 In passing the Radio Act, legislators hoped 
providing political candidates with equal access to broadcast time 
would prevent manipulation of the airwaves. This fear of propaganda 
worried Congress because “American thought and American politics 
will be largely at the mercy of those who operate these stations.”19 
Yet approval of an equal opportunity rule was not universal; the 
possible consequences of such a requirement created some 
apprehension on the congressional debate floor. One U.S. senator 
feared such a regulatory scheme would lead to a situation where 
anyone “desir[ing] to deliver a lecture on bolshevism or 
communism . . . would be entitled to do so.”20 However, none of these 
concerns came to fruition with the Communications Act until the 
advent of television.21  
Candidates viewed this new medium as an essential feature to a 
successful campaign strategy, which led to a growing concern about 
the distribution of its access. The first major amendment to the 
Communications Act occurred in 1959, following the events of a 
Chicago mayoral election. During that race, an independent candidate 
challenged that any television news segments featuring the incumbent 
mayor entitled him to equal airtime under section 315.22 The Federal 
 
15. § 315, 48 Stat. at 1088 (codified in part as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315 
(2006)). 
16. Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 30. 
17. 47 U.S.C. § 315. 
18. Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934); see also In re 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. and Nat’l Broad. Co., 26 F.C.C. 715, 730 
(1959) (noting that section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927 was carried 
forward later as section 315 of the Communications Act). 
19. 67 Cong. Rec. 5,558 (1926) (statement of Sen. Luther Johnson). 
20. 67 Cong. Rec. 12,502 (1926) (statement of Sen. Earl B. Mayfield). 
21. Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 32 (“Section 315 caused no serious 
problems until the advent of television, and then it quickly became clear 
that access to this new medium was essential for any politician seeking 
to gain or maintain public office.”). 
22. See In re Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 26 F.C.C. at 716–17. (“Lar Daly 
[independent mayoral candidate] filed a complaint with the Commission 
alleging that certain Chicago television stations had, in the course of 
their newscasts, shown film clips of his primary opponents in connection 
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Communications Commission (FCC)—the regulatory authority 
responsible for enforcing the Communications Act—agreed.23 In its 
decision, the FCC noted that in 1956, Congress considered a “CBS-
sponsored amendment to exempt news and other broadcasts from 
section 315” but failed to pass such an amendment.24 As a result, 
Congress responded almost immediately by amending the Act to 
allow “legally qualified candidate[s]” to appear in a “(1)  bona fide 
newscast, (2) bona fide news interview, (3) bona fide news 
documentary,” or “(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events,” 
without triggering the equal time rule.25  
Following this amendment by Congress, the next major issue 
became whether debates were to be considered bona fide news events. 
If not, televised debates would be subject to the equal time rule, and 
the opportunity to participate would need to be available to all legally 
qualified candidates. Before this issue would be decided, Congress 
passed a resolution to suspend section 315 of the Communications Act 
for the 1960 presidential race.26 This opened the door for the 1960 
debates between Richard Nixon and John Kennedy, which enabled 
nearly 70 million Americans to view presidential candidates square off 
in a televised debate for the first time in history.27  
Despite the excitement that followed these “Great Debates,”28 just 
two years later in In re Inquiry Concerning Section 315 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 As Amended (Goodwill Station, Inc.),29 
the FCC declined to interpret “bona fide news events” as including 
debates.30 In Goodwill Station, during a 1962 Michigan gubernatorial 
 
with certain events and occasions; that he had requested equal time of 
said stations; and that his requests had been refused.”). 
23. Id. at 743 (“We are further of the opinion that when a station uses film 
clips showing a candidate during the course of a newscast, that 
appearance of a candidate can reasonably be said to be a use, within the 
meaning and intent of section 315.”). 
24. Id. at 734 (emphasis omitted). 
25. Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557 (1959) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) 
(2006)). 
26. Joint Resolution of Aug. 24, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-677, 74 Stat. 554 
(“[S]ection 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 . . . is suspended 
for the period of the 1960 presidential and vice presidential 
campaigns . . . .”).  
27. See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 27–28. 
28. See id. at 41 (noting that the Kennedy-Nixon debates “appeared to 
usher in a new age of political communication”). 
29. 40 F.C.C. 362 (1962). 
30. Id. at 363 (1962) (ruling that debates are not exempted from section 315 
in part because before the enactment of the 1959 amendments to the 
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race, a Socialist Labor Party candidate complained to the FCC that 
he was entitled to equal time after a radio station broadcasted a 
dinner debate between the Democratic and Republican candidates.31 
The FCC ruled in favor of the Socialist Labor Party candidate, even 
though it found that his party only gathered 0.04% of the vote in the 
previous election32 and that the station merely played a passive role in 
covering the debate.33 Although an FCC Chairman at the time of 
Goodwill Station later lamented the agency’s decision in that case,34 
the FCC did not revisit the issue again for over a decade.  
In 1975, the FCC finally overruled Goodwill Station when it 
responded to a petition urging the agency to issue an interpretation of 
section 315 that would include debates within the meaning of the 
“bona fide news events” exemption.35 The FCC agreed with the 
petitioners’ argument that Goodwill Station was “based on . . . an 
incorrect reading of the legislative history” and that Congress never 
intended the “unduly restrictive approach” of discouraging news 
coverage of political debates.36 However, in order for a debate to 
qualify as a “bona fide news event” that is outside the reach of the 
equal time rule of section 315, the debate must also (1) be broadcast 
live in its entirety37 and (2) be sponsored by an independent 
 
Act, “Congress had considered bills which would have exempted debate” 
but did not provide for such an exemption in the law that was passed). 
31. Id. at 362–63. 
32. See id. at 363 (“[T]he Socialist Labor Party received 1,479 votes in a 
state-wide total vote of 3,255,991.”). 
33. See id. at 362–63 (noting that the radio station “play[ed] no part in the 
selection or production of the program[ ]”; “exercise[d] no control 
whatsoever” over its content; and contended it merely covered the 
debate for its “exceptional newsworthiness”). 
34. See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 41 (“In retrospect, there is no 
decision I made in public life that I regret more. I regret it because I 
now believe it to have been an incorrect legal interpretation of 
Section 315. I also regret it because it led to bad policy effects in 1964, 
1968, and 1972.”). 
35. In re Aspen Inst. Program on Commc’n and Soc’y and CBS, Inc., 55 
F.C.C.2d 697, 697, 703 (1975). 
36. Id. at 703, 705 (“Rather, Congress intended that the [FCC] would 
determine whether the broadcaster had in such cases made reasonable 
news judgments as to the newsworthiness of certain events . . . .”). 
37. See id. at 703. 
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organization.38 Challenges were brought against this decision, but 
courts deferred to the FCC’s new interpretation.39 
B. Sponsorship of the Presidential Debates 
1. The League of Women Voters and the Origin of the Commission on 
Presidential Debates (CPD) 
Following the FCC’s decision allowing debates to be categorized 
as news events that were exempt from the equal time rule, televised 
debates were now feasible. The League of Women Voters became the 
initial organizers of presidential debates, satisfying the sponsorship 
requirement under the new interpretation.40 The League sponsored the 
debates in the 1976, 1980, and 1984 elections. In the 1980 election, the 
League invited third-party candidate John Anderson to participate in 
the debate thanks to his twenty percent show of support in the polls.41 
But following Anderson’s invitation, President Jimmy Carter refused 
to participate, leaving only Anderson and Ronald Reagan to 
participate.42 Carter’s refusal was considered a “disappointing failure” 
for the League because it “fail[ed] to give voters an opportunity to see 
and hear all of the serious presidential contenders at the same time.”43 
This disappointing result, coupled with increasingly hostile 
negotiations during the 1984 election, led the two major parties to 
believe they would need to become responsible for the debate in order 
to make each other and their own candidates more accountable.44  
In November 1985, the chairmen of the Democratic and 
Republican National Committees coauthored a memorandum that 
concluded the two parties “should . . . principally and jointly 
sponsor[ ] and conduct[ ]” future joint appearances of their candidates, 
in order to “better fulfill [their] parties’ responsibilities for educating 
and informing the American public and to strengthen the role of 
 
38. See id. at 714–15; see also Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 46 
(“[T]he Aspen decision . . . came with a significant hitch: it did not 
allow stations themselves to organize candidate debates.”). 
39. See, e.g., Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[W]e 
are obligated to defer to the [FCC’s] interpretation, even if it is not the 
only interpretation possible.”). 
40. See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 46 (“The Aspen proposal was 
made with a willing sponsor in mind: the League of Women Voters of 
the United States.”). 
41. Anthony Corrado, Background Paper to Let America Decide: The 
Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on 
Presidential Debates 39, 61–62 (1975). 
42. Id. at 62. 
43. Minow & Lamay, supra note 13, at 57. 
44. Id. at 57–62. 
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political parties in the electoral process.”45 Just fifteen months later, 
the committee chairmen of the two major parties announced the 
creation of the Commission on Presidential Debates.46 The parties’ 
press release described the CPD as “a bipartisan, non-profit, tax 
exempt organization formed to implement joint sponsorship of general 
election presidential and vice presidential debates, starting in 1988.”47 
While the CPD’s press release assumed it would take sole 
responsibility for future presidential and vice presidential debates,48 
the League did not immediately surrender its role. After negotiations 
regarding the 1988 presidential debates, the two organizations 
compromised that the CPD would sponsor the first debate and the 
League would sponsor the second.49 However, in preparing for the 
second debate, the League received a “memorandum of 
understanding” from the campaigns for Vice President Bush and 
Governor Dukakis; the memorandum essentially contained a list of 
demands needed for the candidates’ participation.50  
As a result, the League withdrew its sponsorship because it felt 
“the demands of the two campaign organizations would perpetrate a 
fraud on the American voter.”51 The most objectionable factor cited 
was the “unprecedented control” sought by the two major parties, 
which included demands for “the selection of questioners, the 
 
45. Memorandum of Agreement on Presidential Candidate Joint 
Appearances from Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr., Chairman of the 
Republican National Committee, and Paul G. Kirk, Jr., Chairman of 
the Democratic National Committee (Nov. 26, 1985) [hereinafter 
Memorandum of Agreement], available at http://www.opendebates.org
/theissue/memo.jpg. 
46. Press Release, Democratic and Republican National Committees, RNC 
and DNC Establish Commission on Presidential Debates (Feb. 18, 
1987), [hereinafter CPD Press Release], available at http://www.open
debates.org/theissue/CPDrelease.pdf. 
47. Id.  
48. See id. (“We applaud the League for laying a foundation from which we 
can assume our own responsibilities . . . [and] we would expect and 
encourage the League’s participation in sponsoring other debates, 
particularly in the presidential primary process.”). 
49. Revealing History, OpenDebates.org, http://www.opendebates.org/ 
theissue/strengthenmajorparties.html. 
50. See Memorandum of Understanding from Vice President Bush and 
Governor Dukakis’ representatives (1988), available at http://web.archive.
org/web/20121019085633/http://www.museum.tv/debateweb/html/hist
ory/1988/88essay/memorandum.htm (providing very detailed rules 
governing the dates, location, times, format, moderator selection, 
panelist selection, staging, ticket distribution, seating arrangements, 
dressing rooms, and holding rooms, among other miscellaneous rules). 
51. League, supra note 2. 
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composition of the audience, hall access for the press and other 
issues.”52 League President Nancy M. Neuman further stated:  
It has become clear to us that the candidates’ organizations aim 
to add debates to their list of campaign-trail charades devoid of 
substance, spontaneity and honest answers to tough 
questions . . . . The League has no intention of becoming an 
accessory to the hoodwinking of the American public.53  
The League’s withdrawal left the CPD as the lone staging 
organization that the two major parties would agree to use. It has 
sponsored each presidential debate since 1988.54  
2. CPD Eligibility Requirements for Participants 
The CPD is legally obligated to use objective, nonpartisan criteria 
in choosing the debate participants.55 For the first three elections it 
sponsored the presidential debates, the CPD did not use any 
quantitative measures. In 1988, the CPD considered three criteria in 
selecting its debate participants: (1) evidence of national organization, 
(2) signs of national newsworthiness, and (3) indications of public 
concern. No third-party candidates were invited.56 By 1992, the CPD 
developed the “realistic chance” standard.57 Even though third-party 
candidate Ross Perot’s public support was as low as nine percent in 
the polls, an advisory committee concluded the possibility of his 
election was not unrealistic, so the CPD invited him to the debates.58 
 
52. Id. 
53. See League, supra note 2. 
54. Our Mission, Debates.org, http://www.debates.org/index.php?page= 
about-cpd. 
55. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(c) (2012) (“For all debates, staging 
organization(s) must use pre-established objective criteria to determine 
which candidates may participate in a debate. For general election 
debates, staging organizations(s) shall not use nomination by a 
particular political party as the sole objective criterion to determine 
whether to include a candidate in a debate.”). 
56. Minow & Lamay, supra note 13, at 91.  
57. Id.; see also Letter from Richard E. Neustadt to Paul G. Kirk, Jr. and 
Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr., Commission on Presidential Debates 
(Sept. 17, 1996) [hereinafter Neustadt Letter], available at http://cgi.cnn.
com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/news/9609/18/election.commission/letter.sht
ml (describing the realistic chance standard as a “chance [that] need not 
be overwhelming but must be more than theoretical”). 
58. Minow & Lamay, supra note 13, at 91–92; but see Amato, supra note 6, 
at 226 (stating that Perot’s inclusion in the 1992 debates was a demand 
of the George H.W. Bush campaign after “calculating, erroneously, that 
Perot appealed to Bill Clinton voters more than Bush voters”). 
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Despite finishing the 1992 election with 18.7% of the popular vote,59 
the CPD declined to invite Perot to the 1996 debates after the 
advisory committee determined he did not meet the realistic chance 
standard.60 A number of media outlets fiercely criticized the decision 
to exclude Perot.61 In response, the CPD decided to make its 
eligibility requirements more quantitative and unambiguous by the 
2000 election.62 
This concern for objectivity led to the development of the 
eligibility rules that remain in place today. The CPD has established 
three requirements for a candidate to be eligible for participation in 
the debates. Each candidate must (1) be constitutionally eligible,63 
(2) appear on the ballots in states whose cumulative total of Electoral 
College votes is 270 or more,64 and (3) indicate a level of support of at 
least 15% in an average of five national polls.65 
3. Challengers to the CPD 
The CPD and other staging organizations are no strangers to 
litigation. Third-party candidates have a long history of suing—under 
a range of legal theories—for inclusion in the televised debates during 
election season.66 Rather frequent subjects of litigation include the 
 
59. Minow & Lamay, supra note 13, at 92. 
60. See Neustadt Letter, supra note 57 (“We have concluded that, at this 
stage of the campaign, Mr. Perot has no real chance either of popular 
election in November or of subsequent election by the House of 
Representatives, in the event no candidate obtains an Electoral College 
majority.”); see also Amato, supra note 6, at 226 (stating that Perot’s 
exclusion was influenced by the Dole campaign’s adamant insistence 
that Perot not be invited). 
61. See, e.g., Fixing the Presidential Debates, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1996, 
at A20 (“[B]y deciding yesterday to exclude Ross Perot from this year’s 
debates, the commission proved itself to be a tool of the two dominant 
parties rather than a guardian of the public interest.”); Editorial, 
Include Perot in Debates; Abolish Dysfunctional Debate Commission, 
Sun-Sentinel, Sept. 20, 1996, at A22 (calling the CPD’s decision “an 
outrageous, unfair, discriminatory violation of Perot’s rights and an 
intolerable effort to muzzle his minority views”). 
62. Minow & Lamay, supra note 13, at 93. 
63. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1 (requiring a candidate to be a natural born 
citizen, of at least thirty-five years of age, and a U.S. resident for at 
least fourteen years, to be “eligible to the Office of President”). 
64. This represents the “theoretical” chance of winning the election. See 
2012 Criteria, supra note 7 (providing that a candidate must “have at 
least a mathematical chance of securing an Electoral College majority in 
the 2012 general election”). 
65. Id. 
66. See generally Eric B. Hull, Note, Independent Candidates’ Battle 
Against the Exclusionary Practices of the Commission on Presidential 
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CPD’s partisanship and the 15% polling requirement. For example, in 
2000, Patrick J. Buchanan—the presidential candidate for the Reform 
Party—filed a complaint with the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) alleging that because the CPD violated FEC regulations with 
regard to its political affiliations67 and selection criteria,68 it could not 
qualify as a debate-staging organization.69 After the FEC dismissed 
his administrative complaint, Buchanan challenged its decision in 
federal court.70  
While the district court ultimately upheld the FEC’s dismissal of 
Buchanan’s complaint,71 it appeared reluctant to do so. In refusing to 
overturn the FEC’s determination that the CPD is nonpartisan,72 the 
court noted the “extremely deferential standard of review” it had to 
apply and that “the FEC is entitled to the benefit of the doubt even 
if the unfortunate by-product of the FEC’s decision is increased public 
cynicism about the integrity of our electoral system.”73 The court 
hinted at some skepticism with the 15% threshold,74 but it 
nevertheless declined to override the FEC’s finding that this 
requirement was both “reasonable” and “objective.”75 The court again 
 
Debates, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 313 (2004) (reviewing the history of litigation 
against the CPD and other staging organizations, which includes 
challenges regarding the First Amendment, organizations’ tax-exempt 
status, organizations’ partisanship, acceptance of corporate sponsorships, 
and selection criteria). 
67. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(a) (2012) (providing that only organizations that 
“do not endorse, support, or oppose political candidates or political 
parties may stage candidate debates”). 
68. See § 110.13(c) (requiring “pre-established objective criteria to 
determine which candidates may participate in a debate”). 
69. See Buchanan v. FEC, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58, 61–62 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(describing Buchanan’s administrative complaint). 
70. Id. at 62. 
71. Id. at 76. 
72. See id. at 72 (“[T]he FEC found evidence of possible past influence 
simply insufficient to justify disbelieving the CPD’s sworn statement, 
corroborated by the [Democratic and Republican National Committees], 
that the CPD’s 2000 debate criteria were [not] influenced by the two 
major parties.”). 
73. Id. at 73. 
74. See id. at 74 (“A reasonable person could find it ironic that a candidate 
need win only 5% of the popular vote to be eligible for federal funding, 
but must meet a 15% threshold to be eligible for the debates. However, 
the relevant test is not based on irony, but on objectivity.”).  
75. Id. With regard to the “reasonableness” element, the court stated, “[t]he 
history of 11 C.F.R. § 110.13 makes clear that, although the word 
‘reasonable’ does not appear in the regulation’s text, ‘reasonableness is 
implied.’” Id. (quoting 60 Fed. Reg. 64,262 (Dec. 14, 1995)). 
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noted the “substantial deference [it] must accord to the FEC’s 
interpretation of its own regulations.”76 In light of this deference, the 
court did not find the FEC interpretations to be arbitrary or 
capricious—even though the court acknowledged that “it might be 
good public policy to allow more third party candidates into the 
presidential debates.”77  
Other third-party suits against the CPD have ended in a fashion 
similar to Buchanan’s. At this point, no third-party suit for inclusion 
in the televised presidential debates has been successful.78 But there is 
some evidence—like the dicta in Buchanan—that courts are not 
entirely settled on the idea of having only two parties involved in 
presidential debates. Therefore, despite the lack of success, courts may 
be listening with open ears as third-party candidates continue to use 
the courts to pursue a debate podium. 
4. Challenging the CPD Under a New Theory: Antitrust Violations 
Gary Johnson, the 2012 presidential candidate for the Libertarian 
party, recently continued this pursuit by seeking inclusion under 
antitrust law principles—a legal theory novel in its application to the 
CPD or any staging organization. On September 21, 2012, Johnson 
filed an antitrust suit alleging that (1) the CPD was formed and run 
by both the Republican and Democratic National Committees and 
(2) the 15% polling requirement is a conspiracy to restrain commerce 
by unfairly limiting the opportunities of other competitors to obtain 
the salaried position of the United States Presidency.79 Since this 
complaint does not involve an agency’s interpretation of a statute, it 
would not face the substantial challenge of overcoming the “extremely 
deferential standard of review” a court must use in such 
interpretations.80   
76. Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 74. 
77. Id. at 76. 
78. Hull, supra note 66, at 323; see, e.g., Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381 (1st 
Cir. 2000) (arguing that FEC regulations allowing corporate funding 
violated FECA); Natural Law Party of the United States v. FEC, 111 
F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2000) (challenging the CPD’s selection criteria 
from 1996); Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (challenging the 
partisanship of the CPD, but the court declined jurisdiction because the 
plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies first); Fulani v. 
Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (seeking to invalidate the CPD’s 
tax-exempt status). 
79. Complaint, Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 8:2012cv01600 
(filed Sept. 21, 2012). As of April 2013, nothing has been decided in this 
case. However, Johnson did seek to enjoin the 2012 debates unless he 
was entitled to participate, and this was not successful. Each debate 
went on as scheduled, featuring only the candidates of the two major 
parties. 
80. Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 74. 
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While Johnson is certainly not the first to accuse the CPD of 
being controlled by the two major parties,81 the goal of this Note is 
not to establish the veracity of this claim. Instead, this Note explores 
whether antitrust could be applied as a viable remedy, even if the 
facts alleged by Johnson are assumed to be true. 
II. Obstacles to Reaching the Merits 
Plaintiffs seeking to sue political parties and staging organizations 
under antitrust law would need to overcome a few obstacles before the 
court reaches the merits of the claim. First, a plaintiff must show that 
he or she has standing.82 Second, the plaintiff must persuade a court 
that the political activity exemption to the Sherman Act does not 
extend to candidates seeking to obtain political office.83  
A. Standing 
A third-party candidate suing the CPD for antitrust violations 
would not have an issue with the standing requirement for 
jurisdiction. In order to satisfy standing in a suit against the CPD, a 
plaintiff must establish (1) an “injury in fact,” (2) a causal connection 
between the injury and the defendant’s conduct, and (3) that a 
favorable decision would “likely” redress the injury.84 Missing out on 
an opportunity to participate in the debates typically suffices as an 
injury in fact because of its instrumentality to a candidate’s success in 
the election.85 Third-party candidates only fail to meet the causation 
 
81. See, e.g., Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (“[T]he CPD is not a 
nonpartisan organization, but rather a bipartisan organization 
supporting the Democratic and Republican parties while opposing third 
parties . . . .”); see also, e.g., George Farah, No Debate: How The 
Republican and Democratic Parties Secretly Control the 
Presidential Debates 10 (2004) (claiming that the CPD is a 
fraudulent, bipartisan organization seeking to keep at bay any potential 
threats to the two major parties); Brennan Center for 
Justice et al., Deterring Democracy: How the Commission on 
Presidential Debates Undermines Democracy 3 (2004) (“The 
CPD secretly submits to the demands of the Republican and Democratic 
candidates. .  .  . [and] [m]asquerad[es] as a nonpartisan sponsor . . . .”). 
82. See infra Part II.A. 
83. See infra Part II.B. 
84. Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 62–63 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
85. See Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 65 (“[P]laintiffs will suffer such an 
injury—the loss of an opportunity to participate in the presidential 
debates which few would doubt can be instrumental to a candidate’s 
success in the general election.”); see also Fulani v. League of Women 
Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 626 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he loss of 
competitive advantage flowing from the . . . exclusion of Fulani from the 
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element where the causal nexus is too attenuated.86 By suing the CPD 
directly, third-party candidates would create an immediate link to the 
source of the alleged injury and put to rest any causation issue.  
The redressibility requirement is met if a favorable decision could 
have redressed the plaintiff’s injury at the time he or she brought the 
suit.87 A judgment preserving the possibility of participation in the 
debates would qualify as a relief that would redress the plaintiff’s 
injury.88 If the debates are over by the time the court hears the case, 
it would become an issue of mootness.89 However, mootness here 
would not be a difficult obstacle to overcome because third-party-
inclusion suits qualify for the “capable of repetition, yet evading 
review” exception.90 
Standing is typically not an issue for suits seeking third-party 
inclusion in the debates. The situations where it has precluded courts 
from reaching the merits of a case would not apply to a plaintiff 
alleging Johnson’s claim.91 
 
national debates constitutes sufficient ‘injury’ for standing purposes, 
because such loss palpably impaired Fulani’s ability to compete on an 
equal footing with other significant presidential candidates.”). 
86. See Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1991) cert. denied 
502 U.S. 1048 (1992) (suing the IRS was too attenuated to establish 
standing in a suit seeking inclusion in the debates); cf. Buchanan, 112 F. 
Supp. 2d at 68 (“Here, by contrast [to Fulani v. Brady], plaintiffs have 
sued the FEC . . . . By eliminating the IRS as a link in the chain of 
causation, plaintiffs take a giant leap closer to the actual source of 
harm[, the CPD].”). 
87. E.g., Becker v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 230 F.3d 381, 389 cert. denied 
532 U.S. 1007 (2001) (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that Nadar’s injury could 
have been redressed by a judgment that prevented corporate 
sponsorship of debates and allowed him to participate); see also 
Advanced Mgmt. Tech., Inc. v. FAA, 211 F.3d 633, 636 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (“Standing is assessed ‘at the time the action commences’. . . .” 
(quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000))). 
88. Becker, 230 F.3d at 389. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. (“As other courts have held in similar cases, this sort of case 
qualifies for the exception to mootness for disputes ‘capable of 
repetition, yet evading review’: corporate sponsorship of the debates is 
sure to be challenged again in future elections, yet, as here, the short 
length of the campaign season will make a timely resolution difficult.”); 
League of Women Voters, 882 F.2d at 628 (2d Cir. 1989); Johnson v. 
FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 159 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
91. See Brady, 935 F.2d at 1331 (failing to meet the causation element when 
suing the IRS for inclusion); Crist v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 
262 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2001) (supporters of third parties lack standing to sue 
for a candidate’s exclusion from the debates); Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553, 
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B. “Political Activity” Exemption 
Third-party candidates seeking inclusion to the debates through 
antitrust law would need to show that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 
does not apply. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine stands for the general 
principle that the Sherman Act does not apply to political activity 
with regard to influencing legislative action. In Eastern Railroad 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,92 long-distance 
trucking companies brought an antitrust claim against twenty-four 
major railroad companies, alleging the companies hired a public 
relations firm to campaign against the truckers and lobby for laws 
that would be destructive for the rival trucking business.93 The 
Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act does not apply to joint 
ventures seeking to persuade the legislative or the executive branches 
“to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a 
restraint or a monopoly.”94 The Court broadly stated that political 
activity has no basis in the legislative history of the Act, and that the 
Act is “not at all appropriate” for the “political arena.”95  
The situation in United Mine Workers v. Pennington96 was very 
similar to that in Noerr. In Pennington, a coal labor union and some 
larger coal companies jointly and successfully persuaded the Secretary 
of Labor to raise minimum wages to a point that would drive out 
smaller coal companies.97 A group of those smaller companies brought 
an antitrust suit against the union and larger companies. The 
Supreme Court held that the Noerr rule applied to this situation as 
well, that it “shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to 
influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose,”98 and that it 
was necessary to instruct the jury of this shield.99 
The Supreme Court’s decision to award an antitrust exemption 
for political activity would appear to bar antitrust suits against 
political parties and the CPD, but there is a notable distinction. The 
 
561 (D.C. Cir. 1996) cert. denied 520 U.S. 1210 (1997) (finding that Perot 
lacked standing after failing to initially produce the administrative record). 
92. 365 U.S. 127, 129 (1961). 
93. Id. at 129. 
94. Id. at 136. 
95. Id. at 137, 140–41. 
96. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
97. Id. at 660. 
98. Id. at 669–70. 
99. See id. (“Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the 
antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition. . . . The jury 
should have been so instructed and, given the obviously telling nature of 
this evidence, we cannot hold this lapse to be mere harmless error.”). 
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Noerr-Pennington doctrine deals with political activity in that it 
refuses to extend the Sherman Act to situations in which 
organizations are persuading official legislative actions of individuals 
already holding government office. In cases against the CPD, 
however, there is no official action by the government. The CPD and 
its televised debates involve actions of those seeking to obtain a 
political office, not actions of those already in office. While the 
exclusion of third-party candidates may be a strategy to influence 
governmental policy similar to the parties in Noerr and Pennington, 
the difference is that the CPD’s alleged strategy is far more 
attenuated. Noerr and Pennington each involved private parties 
seeking to change a specific governmental policy by influencing those 
already in power. The exclusion of third-party candidates would be an 
attempt to prevent others from ever reaching that position of power.  
III. Elements of a Section 1 Violation Applied 
Assuming the first two threshold hurdles are met and the court 
reaches the merits of the case, a plaintiff would then need to prove 
that the staging organization’s selection criteria constitute a restraint 
of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.100 Section 1 
provides that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
 
100. This Note dedicates its focus to a section 1 claim; nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that just a decade ago, a third-party candidate could have 
potentially made a compelling argument for a section 2 violation of the 
Sherman Act through the “essential facilities” doctrine. To qualify as an 
“essential facility,” a plaintiff must show that there are no feasible 
alternatives and that “denial of its use inflicts a ‘severe handicap’ 
on potential market entrants.” Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & 
Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasis and alteration 
omitted) (quoting Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997)). If an “essential facility” is found, the Supreme Court has 
held that the defendants must provide access to competitors on a 
nondiscriminatory basis and in a reasonable manner. Third-party 
candidates could have alleged that the debates were an “essential 
facility” because access is necessary to a successful campaign, that they 
are excluded unreasonably, and that if the Republican and Democratic 
National Committees control the CPD, they would not participate in 
other staged debates, making duplication impossible. Arguments for the 
instrumentality of the debates and the unreasonableness of the 15% 
requirement are discussed infra Part III.C and evidence of major-party 
control of the CPD are discussed infra Part III.A. In 2004, however, the 
Supreme Court held that the “essential facilities” doctrine is not 
appropriate where a regulatory agency has the ability to compel access. 
Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004). Thus, since the FEC could 
compel access through its regulations, the “essential facilities” doctrine 
is likely no longer a viable option. 
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several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”101 To 
establish a section 1 violation, a plaintiff must show three elements: 
(1) an agreement or conspiracy exists between two entities, (2) this 
agreement affects interstate commerce, and (3) this agreement 
constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade.102 
A. Agreement or Conspiracy 
The agreement or conspiracy element is reflective of the fact that 
section 1 of the Sherman Act only applies to concerted action.103 To 
qualify as concerted action, the parties involved do not need to be 
legally distinct entities.104 Instead, courts favor a “functional 
consideration of how the parties involved in the alleged 
anticompetitive conduct actually operate.”105 This functional approach 
has resulted in numerous instances in which a single legal entity was 
still found to have engaged in concerted activity.106 The Supreme 
Court has explained that it will look to “the central substance of the 
 
101. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
102. Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Res., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 893, 917 
(S.D. Ohio 1981), aff’d, 691 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1982). The analysis for a 
section 1 violation of the Sherman Act has also been summarized as a 
“two-part test.” If a plaintiff can meet the “threshold requirements”—
showing concerted action that affects interstate commerce—courts will 
move to the “competitive effects test,” which requires the showing of an 
unreasonable restraint of competition. See Marc Edelman, A Short 
Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why the NCAA’s No-Pay 
Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
65, 71 (2013). 
103. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2010) (“Section 1 
only applies to concerted action that restrains trade.”); see also 
Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768–69 (1984) 
(noting that Congress “treated concerted behavior more strictly than 
unilateral behavior” because concerted activity is “fraught with 
anticompetitive risk” since it “deprives the marketplace of independent 
centers of decisionmaking”). 
104. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2209. 
105. Id.  
106. See id. (noting that legally single entities “violate[ ] § 1 when the entity 
was controlled by a group of competitors and served, in essence, as a 
vehicle for ongoing concerted activity”); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 
388 U.S. 350, 356 (1967) (finding Sealy, Inc., which owned and 
controlled a group of mattress manufacturers, met the concerted activity 
requirement because Sealy was not “a separate entity, but . . . an 
instrumentality of the individual manufacturers”); Associated Press v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944) (holding that the Associated Press, a 
cooperative association of newspapers, acted in concert despite being a 
single legal entity incorporated under New York law). 
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situation,” and therefore will be “moved by the identity of the persons 
who act, rather than the label of their hats.”107  
A single legal entity can even be found to act in concert when it 
comprises competitors.108 For example, in Associated Press v. United 
States,109 the Supreme Court held that a cooperative association 
comprising competitor newspapers violated section 1 by acting in 
concert through its bylaws that allowed members to block nonmember 
competitors from membership and prohibited members from selling to 
nonmembers.110 These bylaws “in and of themselves were contracts in 
restraint of commerce in that they contained provisions designed to 
stifle competition in the newspaper publishing field” and “had 
hindered and impeded the growth of competing newspapers.”111  
Even though the CPD is legally a single entity, a third-party 
candidate could make a compelling case that, despite the “label of its 
hat,” the staging organization is actually run by the Democratic and 
Republican National Committees. Notably, the two chairmen of the 
major parties announced the formation of the CPD as a “bipartisan” 
organization,112 and each of these prominent figures continued to play 
influential roles in the CPD.113 In Buchanan v. Federal Election  
107. Sealy, 388 U.S. at 353. 
108. See Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens, 
92 Colum. L. Rev. 497, 506 (1992) (“In a variety of cases, courts have 
found the Section 1 concert of action requirement satisfied when 
participants in an enterprise are also competitors.”). 
109. 326 U.S. 1 (1944). 
110. Id. at 11–13. 
111. Id.  
112. See CPD Press Release, supra note 46 (calling the CPD “a bipartisan, 
non-profit, tax-exempt organization formed to implement joint 
sponsorship of general election presidential and vice-presidential 
debates”); see also Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 45 (“It is 
our bipartisan view that a primary responsibility of each major political 
party is to educate and inform the American electorate . . . . 
Therefore, . . . it is our conclusion that joint appearances should be 
principally and jointly sponsored and conducted by the Republican and 
Democratic National Committees.”); Amato, supra note 6, at 226 
(noting that Frank Fahrenkopf, former chairman of the Republican 
National Committee, admitted in a sworn deposition that the CPD was 
only officially formed as a nonpartisan entity because the lawyers 
counseled them that they “probably couldn’t do it if [they] were a 
bipartisan entity”). 
113. See Jamin B. Raskin, The Debate Gerrymander, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1943, 
1982 (1999) (“From the beginning, the CPD has been co-chaired by 
none other than Frank Fahrenkopf and Paul Kirk, who had together 
declared their commitment to bipartisan televised joint appearances and 
both of whose party affiliations are continually and carefully noted in 
major CPD communications.”); supra Part I.B.1 (discussing how the 
chairmen of the Republican and Democratic Committees formed the CPD). 
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Commission,114 the court acknowledged the reasonableness of such a 
claim and further noted that the FEC’s finding to the contrary 
created the “unfortunate by-product of . . . increased public cynicism 
about the integrity of our electoral system.”115  
While no court has made a factual finding that the CPD is run by 
the two major parties, courts have typically been bound by the 
“extremely deferential standard of review” owed to the FEC’s 
interpretation.116 Under an antitrust claim, no such deference would 
be required. Instead, courts would have much more room to allow for 
this factual determination because the Supreme Court has endorsed a 
functional approach that asks courts to look at the “essence” of an 
entity.117 Thus, it is reasonable to think that a court could find the 
CPD is controlled by a group of competitors and thus able to act in 
concert for purposes of the Sherman Act.  
B. Effect on Interstate Commerce 
1. Debates as Commerce 
The second threshold issue in an antitrust case is establishing that 
the alleged concerted activity affects interstate commerce. While the 
majority of case law on this element focuses on the interstate aspect, 
the activity must still implicate commerce.118 Showing that the 
presidential debates constitute commercial activity for purposes of the 
Sherman Act would likely be the toughest obstacle for a third-party 
candidate to overcome. Only one case has ever discussed an issue 
close to this one, and the court held that holding a political office did 
not implicate commerce under antitrust law.119 But it can be 
distinguished.120 Since this is a novel legal issue, there are no 
precedents directly on point. Therefore, the best a third-party 
candidate could do is argue that other instances where commerce were 
found are sufficiently analogous to this situation. This section 
discusses a few different arguments a third-party candidate could 
make. Even if none of these arguments are persuasive enough 
standing alone, courts will classify the nature of conduct as 
 
114. 112 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000).  
115. Id. at 73.  
116. Id. (applying the deferential standard although “reasonable people could 
certainly disagree about whether the CPD’s credibility determination 
[by the FEC] was correct”). 
117. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2209 (2010). 
118. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“[W]hen [parties] perform acts that are the antithesis of commercial 
activity, they are immune from antitrust regulation.”). 
119. Sheppard v. Lee, 929 F.2d 496, 498 (9th Cir. 1991). 
120. Discussed infra Part III.B.2. 
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commercial or noncommercial in light of the totality of 
circumstances.121 Therefore, in light of a combination of reasonable 
arguments, a court could classify the CPD’s role in staging 
presidential debates as affecting commerce. 
a. Presidency as a Salaried Position 
Under the Sherman Act, “commerce” is not limited to interstate 
commerce.122 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,123 the Court held that 
the exchange of services for money constitutes commerce for Sherman 
Act purposes and that minimum fee schedules prescribed by the 
county bar constituted price fixing in violation of section 1.124 The Bar 
had sought an exclusion from antitrust regulation, “arguing that 
learned professions are not ‘trade or commerce.’”125 The Court 
rejected this argument, however, stating that the “nature of an 
occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the 
Sherman Act, nor is the public-service aspect of professional practice 
controlling in determining whether § 1 includes professions.”126 
Further, the Court held that the examination of a land title is a 
service, and “the exchange of such a service for money is ‘commerce’ 
in the most common usage of that word.”127  
Applying Goldfarb to the subject of this Note, the Court’s 
statements that the nature of an occupation alone does not bar 
Sherman Act litigation tends to suggest that a political office could be 
open to antitrust claims. More specifically, the fact that a position’s 
public-service nature is not controlling seems to further section 1’s 
applicability given the public-service nature of holding a political 
office. Lastly, if the exchange of services for money constitutes 
commerce for the purposes of the Sherman Act, holding the position 
of the president could constitute commerce since it is a salaried 
position in which services are rendered in exchange for money. 
 
121. Brown, 5 F.3d at 666 (3rd Cir. 1993). 
122. See United States v. Natl. Ass’n of Real Est. Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 488 
(“The fact that no interstate commerce is involved is not a barrier to 
this suit. Section 3 of the Sherman Act is not leveled at interstate 
activities alone. It also puts beyond the pale certain conduct purely local 
in character and confined to the District of Columbia.”). 
123. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
124. Id. at 782-88. 
125. Id. at 787. 
126. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787 (citation omitted); see also United States v. 
Brown University, 5 F.3d 658, 666 (3rd Cir. 1993) (“The exchange of 
money for services, even by a nonprofit organization, is a quintessential 
commercial transaction.”). 
127. Id. at 787–88. 
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b. Nonprofit Contributions and Sponsorships 
The CPD is financed primarily through corporate sponsorships.128 
Multinational corporations—some of the largest in the country129—
have donated millions of dollars to the staging organization.130 In 
exchange for these donations, corporations receive an array of 
benefits: tax-deductions,131 advertisement opportunities,132 and a 
chance to make what amounts to a “bipartisan contribution.”133 In 
addition to this reciprocal relationship, it has been argued that the 
CPD benefits from third-party exclusion not only because it insulates 
the two parties from competition but also because this exclusion 
appeases its funding sources.134 Corporate sponsors of the CPD will 
donate millions of dollars to the two major parties every year in order 
to “sustain a business-friendly two-party system.”135 After such an 
investment, these corporations “aren’t very eager to allow a third-
party candidate the opportunity to ascend to the presidency and 
thereby render their investment less valuable.”136 Under this theory, a 
plaintiff could even argue that the CPD serves as a vehicle for 
ensuring a return on investment for these corporations. 
Even if a defendant’s activity is not in itself interstate commerce, 
the Supreme Court has made clear that a plaintiff can still meet the 
“effect on interstate commerce” element by showing that the activity 
 
128. Corporate Sponsorship, Open Debates, http://www.opendebates.org/ 
theissue/corpsponsor.html (last updated Jan. 2, 2013).  
129. See id. (“Tobacco giant Phillip Morris was a major sponsor in 1992 and 
1996. Anheuser-Busch has sponsored presidential debates in 1996, 2000, 
2004, 2008 and 2012.”). 
130. Id. 
131. See Farah, supra note 81 at 16 (“[D]onations to the CPD are tax-
deductible.”). 
132. See id. at 14 (describing how in 1992 Philip Morris was able to “hang a 
large banner that was visible during postdebate interviews” after 
donating $250,000 (citing Jonathan Groner & Sheila Kaplan, Buying 
Smoke and Mirrors at the Debates, Legal Times, Nov. 2, 1992)); id. 
(describing how in 2000 Anheuser-Busch was able to set up 
informational booths at the debate site after donating $550,000 (citing 
Joe Battenfeld, Company Sponsors’ Funds ‘Ad’ Up, Boston Herald, 
Oct. 2, 2000, at 6)). 
133. See id. at 15–16 (noting that corporations view a donation to the CPD 
as a way to donate to both major parties simultaneously) (quoting an 
interview with Nancy Neuman, former president of the League of 
Women Voters, Aug. 24, 2001). 
134. See id. at 16. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. (quoting Nathan Johnson, Presidential Debates Betray Democracy, 
Press & Dakotan, Oct. 17, 2000). 
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“has an effect on some other appreciable activity demonstrably in 
interstate commerce.”137 A third-party candidate could argue that the 
CPD’s quid-pro-quo relationship with such giant businesses helps 
establish the debates’ link to commercial activity. For example, 
advertising—which has been an antitrust issue on its own138—can 
affect a company’s sales. Therefore, by offering advertising 
opportunities to companies that do business across the country, the 
CPD has arguably had “an effect on some other appreciable activity 
demonstrably in interstate commerce,” thus meeting the second 
threshold requirement to an antitrust claim.  
The CPD’s status as a nonprofit organization would not serve as 
a deterrent to antitrust litigation. The Supreme Court has plainly 
stated that “[t]here is no doubt that the sweeping language of § 1 
applies to nonprofit entities.”139 However, there are differing views 
about the application of nonprofit contributions to antitrust law. In 
Dedication and Everlasting Love to Animals v. The Humane 
Society,140 the Ninth Circuit held that contributions to a nonprofit 
organization did not constitute commerce under the Sherman Act, 
and therefore there was no liability under the Act.141 But in United 
States v. Brown University,142 the Third Circuit held that a nonprofit 
entity can be subject to Sherman Act claims if it conducts 
commercial, rather than “pure[ly] charit[able],” transactions.143 In its 
analysis, the Brown court specifically noted that courts should classify 
a transaction as commercial or noncommercial based on the nature of 
the conduct in light of the totality of surrounding circumstances.144 
While the CPD’s receipt of corporate funds may not on its own help 
constitute commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act, the fact could 
be weighed in the totality of circumstances and help tip the scales in 
favor of third-party-candidate claims.  
 
137. McLain v. Real Est. Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 233 (1980). 
138. See Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, Efficiency and Image: 
Advertising As an Antitrust Issue, 1990 Duke L.J. 321, 328 (1990) 
(discussing how mass advertising creates anticompetitive effects through 
entry barriers). 
139. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100, n. 22 (1984). 
140.  50 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 1995). 
141. Id. at 712. 
142. 5 F.3d 658 (3rd Cir. 1993). 
143. Id. at 665–68 (finding a university properly subject to the Sherman Act 
because “financial assistance to students is part and parcel of the 
process of setting tuition and thus a commercial transaction”). 
144. Id. at 666. 
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c. An Economic Doctrine Extended to the Political Arena 
Politics and economics are certainly not interchangeable, but they 
are nevertheless connected. In law, there is at least one example 
where an economic doctrine has been extended to aid third-party 
candidates. The “competitor standing doctrine” began as “well-settled 
[law] that an economic actor may challenge the government’s 
bestowal of an economic benefit on a competitor.”145 Courts then 
“expanded the competitor standing doctrine to the political arena, 
recognizing that political actors may bring suit when they are 
competitively disadvantaged.”146 While this doctrine would not be 
needed for a plaintiff alleging antitrust violations against the CPD, it 
still demonstrates that courts have recognized a link between 
economic activity and politics. Thus, it shows that there is a chance 
courts could look beyond the presidential debates as purely political 
and consider, in the totality of circumstances, its broader effects in 
concluding that the debates sufficiently affect commerce for purposes 
of the Sherman Act. 
2. Distinguishing Sheppard 
While Gary Johnson was the first third-party candidate to allege 
antitrust violations by a staging organization in its televised debates, 
it is not the first time an aspiring candidate has sued under antitrust 
law for exclusion in seeking to obtain political office. In Sheppard v. 
Lee,147 an Arizona county road maintenance crew worker filed a 
petition to run for a seat on the Apache County Board of 
Supervisors.148 After learning of his intention, the members of the 
Board unanimously voted to amend to the Apache County employee 
rules and regulations to prohibit employees from running for any 
elected office while they were still employed by the county.149 The 
defendants then promptly fired Sheppard pursuant to this new 
amendment.150 Sheppard responded by suing the Board under the 
Sherman Act. But the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit rejected this argument, holding that “[d]ismissal of Sheppard’s 
case was proper because neither the business of conducting the 
 
145. Buchanan v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63 (D.D.C. 
2000). 
146. Id. 
147. 929 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1991). 
148. Id. at 497. 
149. Id. The amendment provided that “[n]o employee may remain employed if 
he offers himself for nomination or election to any salaried Apache County, 
State of Arizona or Federal elective office unless that office will become 
vacant at the next election by retirement of the elected official.” Id. 
150. Id. 
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government nor the holding of a political office constitutes ‘trade or 
commerce’ within the meaning of the Sherman Act.”151 
Such precedent is discouraging for third-party candidates hoping 
antitrust law is their ticket to the debate, but it does not create an 
insurmountable barrier because this case can be distinguished. In 
Sheppard, the plaintiff was fired “pursuant to a May 16, 1988, 
amendment to the Apache County employee rules and regulations,”152 
meaning it was an official governmental action that was limiting his 
opportunity to obtain the public office. Therefore, the court could 
have reached the same conclusion without addressing whether holding 
political office constituted commerce because the court could have 
based its decision solely on the fact that it involved a governmental 
action—where antitrust law does not apply according to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine.153  
Another issue is that both Noerr and Pennington involved private 
parties seeking to influence the government to use its power to 
disadvantage their rivals. But in Sheppard, it is actual members of the 
government seeking to insulate themselves from competition. This 
appears to be more problematic since that is essentially what Johnson 
is alleging—that the two major parties are using the debates to keep 
third-party competition at bay. But the difference again lies in official 
governmental action. In Sheppard, the Board passed an official 
anticompetitive act. In a case such as Johnson’s, there is no official 
act that has been passed to govern the selection criteria of the 
debates. If Congress were to do so, it would then certainly be 
insulated from antitrust law. But until then, this precedent would not 
be overly detrimental. 
C. An Unreasonable Restraint 
Not all concerted activity affecting interstate commerce is subject 
to antitrust liability. Section 1, if read literally, would appear to bar 
all contracts because most business deals restrain trade to some 
degree.154 Consequently, in 1911, the Supreme Court held that the 
restraint must be “unreasonably restrictive of competitive 
conditions.”155 Thus, even if a court found that the CPD’s eligibility 
 
151. Id. at 498. 
152. Id. at 497. 
153. See supra Part II.B. 
154. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2010) (“Taken 
literally, the applicability of § 1 to ‘every contract, combination . . . or 
conspiracy’ could be understood to cover every conceivable 
agreement . . . [section] 1 would address ‘the entire body of private 
contract,’ that is not what the statute means.” (citing Nat’l Soc. of 
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978))).  
155. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911). 
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requirements met the two threshold elements, a third-party candidate 
would still need to prove that the requirements were unreasonably 
restrictive.  
Restraints are usually analyzed under the “traditional ‘rule of 
reason.’”156 The rule of reason is used where there is likely some 
consumer benefit,157 and requires a court to “weigh[ ] all of the 
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice 
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on 
competition.”158 A plaintiff “bears an initial burden under the rule of 
reason of showing that the alleged combination or agreement 
produced adverse, anti-competitive effects within the relevant product 
and geographic markets.”159 Therefore, in an antitrust suit against the 
CPD, a plaintiff would bear the burden of proving that the eligibility 
criteria are unreasonable after weighing all of the circumstances. 
1. Justifications for the 15% Requirement 
A court would likely apply a rule of reason test because the CPD 
has a number of reasonable justifications for its eligibility 
requirements. The first two requirements—that a client be 
constitutionally eligible and be on a number of ballots that would 
make it mathematically possible to win the Electoral College—would 
likely be conceded as justified because absent those two requirements, 
the candidates would not even have a theoretical chance of winning.160 
The criterion likely to receive the most scrutiny is the third element, 
which requires a 15% showing of support in polls.161 
In justifying the 15% requirement, the CPD would argue that the 
most important goal of the debates is to ultimately give the voters a 
chance to observe and decide between the two candidates with a “real 
chance” of winning as they discuss their stances on key issues.162 In 
fact, the original founders of the CPD described this aspect of the 
 
156. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (1993) (quoting Cont’l 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)).  
157. See also Edelman, supra note 102, at 73–75 (noting that there are three 
sanctioned tests for a competitive effects analysis: (1) the per se test for 
highly “nefarious” restraints that likely have no “redeeming value,” 
(2) the rule of reason test for restraints that might benefit consumers, 
and (3) the “abbreviated or quick-look rule of reason” for a 
combination). 
158. Cont’l T.V., 433 U.S. at 49. 
159. Brown, 5 F.3d at 668. 
160. See 2012 Criteria, supra note 7. 
161. Id. 
162. Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 95.  
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debates as a “primary responsibility” of the two major parties.163 If 
access to the debates becomes too easy for third-party candidates, the 
CPD risks scaring away the major candidates and thus depriving 
voters of a valuable opportunity to make an informed voting 
decision.164 Further, new eligibility rules could create a disparate 
impact on public confidence in the debates. More relaxed standards 
for entry could lead to an overcrowded and chaotic event165 and open 
the doors to some of the more extreme parties—reminiscent of 
Senator Mayfield’s “bolshevism and communism” concern prior to the 
enactment of the 1927 Radio Act.166 
2. Whether the 15% Requirement Is Overly Broad 
While there are reasonable justifications for limiting access to the 
debates, the restraint can still be unreasonable if it is broader than 
necessary to achieve its legitimate objectives.167 A third-party 
candidate could argue that the 15% requirement is overly broad 
because it unduly limits access to a necessary event when less 
restrictive alternatives are readily available. 
a. Necessity of Access to the Debates 
Third-party candidates would argue that the 15% requirement is 
still unreasonably restrictive because the threshold is too high for 
access to a vehicle that is necessary for success.168 Media coverage is 
“an essential component of a successful modern campaign” because it 
legitimizes candidates and generates recognition, both of which are 
“indispensible in attracting votes.”169 Voters expect to see their 
 
163. See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 45 (“It is our bipartisan view 
that a primary responsibility of each major political party is to educate 
and inform the American electorate of its fundamental philosophy and 
policies as well as its candidates’ positions on critical issues.”). 
164. See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 95. 
165. See id. at 85–86 (discussing a crowded Italian political debate in which 
the participating politicians began calling each other names such as 
“drunkard” or “useful idiot”). 
166. 67 Cong. Rec. 12,502 (daily ed. Jul. 1, 1926) (statement of Sen. 
Earl B. Mayfield). 
167. See United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1385 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (holding that a realty service’s membership requirements 
were “overly broad to accomplish any legitimate goals of the 
association” in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
168. Id. at 1370 (“[W]hen the association possesses the requisite market 
power, membership in the listing service becomes essential to a broker’s 
ability to compete effectively, and the unreasonable (in competitive 
terms) exclusion of a broker may create unjustified harm to the broker 
and the public.”). 
169. Rosenstone et al., supra note 5, at 33. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 1·2013 
The Political Duopoly 
266 
candidates on television.170 The benefits of participation in the 
presidential debates—the free publicity and opportunity to reach tens 
of millions of voters—are irreplaceable in terms of campaign 
strategy.171 Debates thus serve a monumental role in campaigns and 
serve as a “defining feature of candidate viability.”172 In light of the 
debates’ significance, the 15% requirement thus creates “something of 
a catch-22. In order to gain popular support, the candidate must 
participate in the debates; but in order to participate in televised 
debates, the candidate must demonstrate popular support.”173 
The CPD’s brief history reveals the potential efficiency of the 
debates as a vehicle to gain support and the restrictive nature of its 
criteria. In 1992, Ross Perot was the last third-party candidate to 
participate in a presidential debate.174 Prior to the debates, Perot 
polled at less than ten percent.175 After the debates, Perot 
approximately doubled his support, as he was able to capture nearly 
nineteen percent of the popular vote.176 Perot’s subsequent exclusion 
from the 1996 debates under the same realistic chance standard led to 
a public backlash, which influenced the CPD to amend its eligibility 
requirements that are used to this day.177 Since the 15% requirement 
has been enforced, no third-party candidates have been able to 
participate in the debates. 
Courts have also recognized the weighty competitive advantage 
debate participants receive over nonparticipants. In Fulani v. League 
of Women Voters Education Fund,178 the Second Circuit stated: 
In this era of modern telecommunications, who could doubt the 
powerful beneficial effect that mass media exposure can have 
today on the candidacy of a significant aspirant seeking national 
political office. The debates sponsored by the League were 
broadcast on national television, watched by millions of 
 
170. See Sidney Kraus, Televised Presidential Debates and Public 
Policy 20 (2d ed. 2000) (“Young voters today have been raised with 
television, and they expect to see presidential candidates perform at 
least adequately on television.”). 
171. Amato, supra note 6, at 224–25. 
172. Id. at 224. 
173. Jelen, supra note 8, at 4. 
174. See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 91–92 (noting Perot was 
invited pursuant to the realistic chance standard). 
175. Jeff Milchen, Presidential Debates is Really Duopoly by Design, SFGate 
(Aug. 22, 2000, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum
/article/Presidential-Debate-Is-Really-Duopoly-by-Design-2709060.php. 
176. Id. 
177. See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text. 
178. 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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Americans, and widely covered by the media. It is beyond 
dispute that participation in these debates bestowed on the 
candidates who appeared in them some competitive advantage 
over their non-participating peers.179  
When the D.C. Circuit quoted this passage from Buchanan v. Federal 
Election Commission,180 the court described it as a “fundamental, and 
rather obvious, point.”181 Such language clearly demonstrates a 
judicial acknowledgement of the instrumentality debates serve to a 
successful campaign in the modern political landscape. 
b. Availability of Less Restrictive Alternatives 
The availability of less restrictive alternatives can also influence 
the reasonableness analysis.182 For the presidential debates, there have 
been a number of recommendations for less restrictive options for the 
third criterion in selecting the participants. One suggestion is to 
remove the third criterion altogether, leaving just the first two 
requirements.183 This alone would significantly lower the field of 
constitutionally eligible candidates because just getting on the ballot 
involves an arduous petition process in most states.184 Since 1988, of 
the roughly 200 individuals who run each year, the highest number of 
third-party candidates to reach the ballot requirement in a single year 
has only been five.185 However, if ballot eligibility became the strictest 
 
179. Id. at 626. 
180. 112 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000). 
181. Id. at 65. 
182. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“Another pertinent inquiry would explore the 
availability of less restrictive alternatives.”). 
183. See, e.g., Compl., Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 
8:2012cv01600, at 6–7 (asking the court to limit the CPD’s eligibility 
requirements to the first two); Raskin, supra note 113, at 1997–98 
(calling for all constitutionally eligible candidates who meet the 
balloting requirement to be allowed to participate in the debates, so 
long as they are “serious” about their candidacy and not “lampooning” 
the event). In fact, Raskin’s suggestion was even broader because it 
called for there to always be a third party present at the debate. If no 
third party met the requisite ballot total, then whichever candidate had 
the third highest total number of ballots would be invited. Id. at 1997.  
184. William J. Keefe & Marc J. Hetherington, Parties, Politics, 
and Public Policy in America 50 (9th ed. 2003). 
185. See The 15 Percent Barrier, Open Debates, http://opendebates.org/ 
theissue/15percent.html (“In 1988 only two third-party candidates, in 
1992 only three third-party candidates, in 1996 only four third-party 
candidates, in 2000 only five third-party candidates, in 2004 only four 
third-party candidates, in 2008 only four third-party candidates, and in 
2012 only two third-party candidates.”). 
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requirement, that would become the full-time focus of all third-party 
campaigns and might eventually result in an unmanageable amount of 
qualified debaters.186 
Another proposal is to drop the 15% requirement down to a 5% 
show of support. This makes sense for a number of reasons. For one, 
it is a compelling argument that if the ballot barrier were the highest 
bar, then third-party campaigns would make that their primary 
concern187 due to the bounty of advantages that accompany 
participation.188 Secondly, one of the crucial benefits of third-party 
inclusion is that they serve an important function of raising issues 
that the two major candidates may otherwise ignore.189 But voter 
support of third-party candidates typically only occurs where there is 
substantial dissatisfaction with the major-party candidates;190 thus a 
showing of some support would help reveal what issues are most 
important to voters. Lastly, this percentage mirrors the threshold 
requirement for minor parties to be eligible for federal campaign 
funding.191 The D.C. Circuit has noted the logical sense it would make 
to align these thresholds.192 As former New York Governor, Mario 
Cuomo, reasoned, “[i]f you’re going to give them taxpayers’ money on 
the theory that they’re credible candidates, then you ought to let 
them participate.”193 One possible and interesting change to this 
suggestion is to set an initial debate at a 5% threshold, which then 
increases with each debate in a given election year.194  
186. Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 95. 
187. Id. 
188. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
189. Rosenstone, supra note 5, at 221. 
190. Id. at 163. 
191. See 11 C.F.R. § 9008.2(d) (defining “minor parties” as those who receive 
“5 percent or more, but less than 25 percent” of the popular vote in an 
election); § 9008.3(b) (entitling “minor parties” to payments with 
respect to any presidential nominating convention). 
192. See Buchanan v. FEC, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58, 74 (D.D.C. 2000) (“A 
reasonable person could find it ironic that a candidate need win only 5% 
of the popular vote to be eligible for federal funding, but must meet a 
15% threshold to be eligible for the debates.”). 
193. The 15 Percent Barrier, Open Debates, http://opendebates.org/the 
issue/15percent.html. 
194. See Farah, supra note 81, at 152 (describing a senator’s proposal that a 
staging organization host a preliminary debate including any candidate 
who was either on all fifty state ballots or showed a 5% level of support; 
subsequent debates would then require a 10% threshold); Hull, supra 
note 66, at 342–43 (noting that a polling threshold represents a good 
compromise because it gives third-party candidates a legitimate chance 
to participate and share their ideas while trimming the participants to 
the more likely victors as the election nears). 
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Representative Jesse L. Jackson Jr. proposed another noteworthy 
suggestion: in addition to the 5% barrier, a third party should be 
included if a majority of those polled indicated they would like to see 
that candidate participate. Jackson proposed the following resolution 
to Congress:  
Presidential candidate should be permitted to participate in 
debates among candidates if—(1) at least 5 percent of 
respondents in national public opinion polls of all eligible voters 
support the candidate’s election for President; or (2) if a 
majority of respondents in such polls support the candidate’s 
participation in such debates.195 
While Jackson’s proposal was not successful, it would have addressed 
the issue that third-party exclusion from the debates is often at odds 
with the preferences of the majority of voters.196 
These examples of offered suggestions illustrate the variety of 
selection criteria available to a staging organization. While they may 
not be perfect, these alternatives are less restrictive than the 15% 
requirement while still achieving the CPD’s legitimate justifications of 
preventing a chaotic event. In light of all of these considerations, a 
court could reasonably conclude that the CPD’s 15% requirement 
meets the elements of a section 1 violation as an unreasonable 
restraint on competitive activity. 
IV. Why Courts Should Allow Antitrust Application 
A court faced with a third-party suit against the CPD alleging 
antitrust violations may understandably be unwilling to rule in the 
plaintiff’s favor. The Supreme Court’s sweeping statements in direct 
opposition to Sherman Act application in the political arena197 would 
likely serve as a powerful deterrent, and with good reason. However, 
there is a possible distinction between a third-party suit against the 
CPD and this political activity exemption198 and, further, the Supreme 
 
195. H.R. Con. Res. 373, 106th Cong. (2000). 
196. The 15 Percent Barrier, Open Debates, http://opendebates.org/the 
issue/15percent.html (noting that seventy-six percent of voters wanted 
to see Perot debate in 1996 and that sixty-four percent of voters wanted 
to see both Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan included in the 2000 
presidential debates). 
197. E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 141 
(1961) (“The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for the 
business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political 
arena.”). 
198. See supra Part II.B (discussing a possible distinction to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine). 
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Court is capable of changing its treatment of antitrust applicability in 
certain arenas.199  
But even if the court reaches the merits, there is neither direct 
nor wholly analogous precedent to control the application. 
Consequently, each of the possible third-party-candidate arguments 
regarding the elements of a section 1 violation may be viewed as 
somewhat strained.200 Nevertheless, a court could still rationally 
conclude, after weighing the totality of circumstances, that the 15% 
requirement constitutes a concerted action resulting in an 
unreasonable restraint of competition affecting commerce. If a court 
finds that it could rule in favor of a third-party candidate in an 
antitrust suit against the CPD, it should rule accordingly due to the 
number of public policy benefits that can stem from third-party 
inclusion in the debates.  
A. Public Policy Benefits of Including Third-Party Candidates 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the impact and 
importance of debates in public policy. It has stated that there is a 
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”201 The Court has 
further recognized that debates have an “exceptional significance in 
the electoral process”202 because they give voters the opportunity to 
“intelligently evaluate the candidates’ personal qualities and their 
positions on vital public issues” before making a decision.203 
Additionally, political campaigns enjoy First Amendment protections 
because they involve the “unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.”204 Third-party candidates are often the vehicle to energize 
these desired political and social changes valued by the Court. 
The CPD’s emphasis on only featuring candidates with a realistic 
chance of winning205 devalues the contributions third-party candidates 
can make without receiving a single vote. Third-party candidates 
 
199. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the evolution of antitrust application 
in professional sports). 
200. See supra Part III.A–C (discussing these possible third-party 
candidate arguments). 
201. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
202. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675 (1998). 
203. Id. (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981)). 
204. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (quoting Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
205. The 15% requirement was an attempt to quantify the realistic chance 
standard. See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 93 (discussing the 
need to revise its selection criteria so that it was more concrete).  
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serve two critical roles in American politics: (1) they bring issues to 
the table that the major parties may otherwise ignore and (2) they 
reflect and amplify citizen discontent with the major-party policies.206 
Rationally, the major parties will react to these signs of voter 
discontent.207 Third-party candidates have helped popularize several 
groundbreaking ideas—such as the abolition of slavery, social security, 
child labor laws, labor union formation, public schools, and public 
power—before they were adopted by major parties.208 But while third-
party candidates may bring different ideas to the forefront, the more 
effective route to alter policy may be to target specific candidates 
within the major parties who share the same values and are willing to 
represent that point of view.209 
Even if it is not the most effective method, that does not discredit 
third-party candidates’ value as a vehicle for effectuating social 
change. For example, in 1992 Ross Perot made the growing federal 
budget deficit a main tenet of his campaign. Neither the Republicans 
nor Democrats were eager to raise the issue because the deficit 
ballooned during Republican presidencies and Democratic majorities 
in the House of Representatives.210 Perot forced the issue at the 
debates and was able to swiftly bring attention to the problem, which 
increased public concern.211 However, the changes third-party 
candidates help bring are not always positive. For example, in 1968, 
the Nixon administration softened its stance on racial integration in 
order to attract the supporters of American Independent Party 
candidate George Wallace.212 Nevertheless, third-party candidates 
serve as an important check on the major parties. Voters can use the 
threat of exit to enforce accountability among elected officials.213 
Thus, even if they are not elected, third-party candidates serve a 
crucial role in the preservation of democracy.214 
Third-party inclusion in the debates can result in a positive 
impact on voter interest and turnout.215 Ross Perot’s inclusion in the 
 
206. Rosenstone et al., supra note 5, at 221. 
207. Id. at 222. 
208. The 15 Percent Barrier, Open Debates, http://opendebates.org/the 
issue/15percent.html.  
209. See Keefe & Hetherington, supra note 184, at 51. 
210. Id. at 53. 
211. Id. at 53–54. 
212. Rosenstone et al., supra note 5, at 111. 
213. Id. at 222. 
214. Id. 
215. The debates themselves would also benefit by receiving less skepticism and 
a boost of public confidence. See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 100. 
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1992 debates demonstrated this possibility. For one, he was able to 
raise public consciousness about vital matters.216 Another indicator of 
voter interest is the viewership of the debates, and the 1992 three-way 
debates had over twice as many viewers as the Clinton-Dole debates 
of 1996.217 Television ratings dropped with each Clinton-Dole debate, 
while the 1992 debates drew progressively larger audiences.218 Finally, 
Perot’s inclusion in the 1992 debates helped boost voter turnout. 
Roughly twelve million more people voted than in the previous 
presidential election.219  
The American political system currently seems ripe for the 
introduction of third-party candidates into the presidential debates. 
Recently, a polling indicated that a record-high forty percent of 
Americans identified themselves as independents.220 This percentage 
was higher than the level of support shown for either of the two major 
parties.221 Thus, voters may be more interested than ever to hear 
alternative points of view. Besides, even if the third-party candidate 
does not have a realistic chance of winning the presidency, voters may 
still simply want to see them debate.222  
B. Historical Support 
1. Broader Purposes of the Sherman Act 
Benefits to public policy should be influential in antitrust 
litigation because “the Sherman Act embodies what is to be 
characterized as an eminently ‘social’ purpose.”223 Senator John  
216. Include Perot in Debates; Abolish Dysfunctional Debate Commission, 
supra note 61. See also Keefe & Hetherington, supra note 184 
(discussing Perot’s use of the debates to raise public awareness of the 
federal budget deficit issue). 
217. See Milchen, supra note 175. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Jeffrey M. Jones, Record-High 40% of Americans Identify as 
Independents in ‘11, Gallup Politics (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.gallup.
com/poll/151943/record-high-americans-identify-independents.aspx. 
221. See id. (polling indicated levels of support for Democrats and Republicans 
at thirty-one percent and twenty-seven percent, respectively). 
222. See, e.g., Include Perot in Debates; Abolish Dysfunctional Debate 
Commission, supra note 61 (“Perot isn’t going to win the election. But 
so what? He has a lot of interesting, informative things to say, and 
ought to be heard . . . .”). 
223. Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy 227 (1954). 
See also Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust 
Movement?, in The Paranoid Style in American Politics and 
Other Essays 205 (1965) (“The political and social arguments against 
monopoly were pressed with greater clarity than the economic argument 
and with hardly less fervor.”). 
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Sherman himself at times evinced the idea that one of the key 
attributes of the Act was to free citizens of corruption and maintain 
“freedom of independent thinking in political life.”224 Its cornerstone 
principle rests on the philosophy of competition.225 This philosophy 
reflects the deep-seated American value of establishing checks to 
prevent the concentration of power.226 In addition to its economic 
uses, there existed a “moral” objective of the Sherman Act, which 
stood for a notion of fairness and that “newcomers be able to enter 
the game . . . on reasonably open terms.”227 Thus, beyond the 
economic purposes of the Act, there exist the broader purposes of fair 
competition and checks on concentrated power. These goals would 
appear to support an application of the Act to the CPD if a court 
found that the staging organization helps insulate two entities from 
competition. 
For such a powerful law, the Sherman Act contains relatively 
little and simple language. Section 1, in its entirety, is less than one 
hundred words.228 One extensive review of the legislative intent of the 
Act theorized that Congress was intentionally vague in order to allow 
for greater judicial discretion.229 In light of this, a court could point to 
some historical support if it decides to extend the doctrine for the 
purposes of limiting exclusionary practices for public good. 
 
224. Thorelli, supra note 223, at 227. 
225. Id.; see also Peter R. Dickson and Philippa K. Wells, The Dubious Origins 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act: The Mouse That Roared, 20 J. Pub. Pol’y 
& Marketing 3, 3 (2001) (noting that the Sherman Act “enshrine[ed] the 
principle that more competition is better than less competition”). 
226. See Hofstadter, supra note 223, at 205 (“From the pre-Revolutionary 
tracts through the Declaration of Independence and The Federalist to 
the writings of the states’ rights advocates, and beyond the Civil War 
into the era of antimonopoly writers and the Populists, there had been a 
perennial quest for a way of dividing, diffusing, and checking power and 
preventing its exercise by . . . a consolidated group of interests at a 
single center.”). 
227. Id. at 209. 
228. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared 
to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine 
not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, 
$1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the court.”). 
229. See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman 
Act, 9 J.L. & Econ. 7, 48 (1966) (“Sherman and others clearly 
believed that they were legislating a policy and delegating to the courts 
the elaboration of subsidiary rules.”). 
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2. Evidence of an Evolving Doctrine: The Baseball Trilogy 
Although the Supreme Court has previously frowned upon the 
idea of applying antitrust law to the political arena,230 that does not 
mean this will always be its impression. Antitrust law doctrine has 
shown an ability to change over time, and this flexibility is well 
evidenced by the evolution of baseball’s “antitrust exemption.” In 
Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball 
Clubs231—the Court’s first opportunity to review the application of 
antitrust law to sports—the Supreme Court ruled that this profession 
did not constitute commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act.232 
Although the lower courts may not have liked this result,233 the 
Court—in follow-up case Toolson v. New York Yankees234—refused to 
overturn Federal Baseball because the sport had developed a reliance 
on the exemption.235 
Despite its refusal to subject baseball to antitrust violations, the 
Court eventually changed its stance that sports did not constitute 
commerce under the Sherman Act. In the years following Federal 
Baseball and Toolson, the Court ruled that professional boxing,236 
football,237 and basketball238 leagues were all subject to antitrust 
liability. In Flood v. Kuhn239—the final case of the “baseball trilogy”— 
the Court, still refusing to remove baseball’s antitrust exemption,240 
admitted this was an illogical conclusion supported only by stare 
 
230. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine). 
231. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
232. Id. at 208–09 (refusing to analyze baseball’s reserve clause after holding 
that the fans’ personal effort to cross state lines to pay to watch the 
exhibitions “is not a subject of commerce”). 
233. Peter A. Carfagna, Sports and the Law: Examining the 
Legal Evolution of America’s Three “Major Leagues” 56 
(2d ed. 2011) (noting a statement by the Second Circuit that players 
were regarded as “quasi-peons” (quoting Gardella v. Chandler, 
172 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1949))). 
234. 346 U.S. 356 (1953). 
235. See id. at 357 (“The business has thus been left for thirty years to 
develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing 
antitrust legislation.”). 
236. United States v. Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955). 
237. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). 
238. Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971). 
239. 407 U.S. 258 (1971). 
240. Id. at 283–84 (“Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed [Federal 
Baseball and Toolson] to stand for so long . . . [that it] has clearly 
evinced a desire not to disapprove of them legislatively.”). 
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decisis that could only be remedied by the legislature.241 Nevertheless, 
the Court firmly stated that “[p]rofessional baseball is a business and 
it is engaged in interstate commerce,”242 thus coming full circle on its 
initial determination. This willingness to adapt its analysis in different 
times may somewhat relieve any third-party candidate discouraged by 
the Courts initial reaction to antitrust application in the political 
arena in Noerr-Pennington. 
C. Ease of Transition 
A court should not hesitate to find the 15% requirement 
unreasonable for fear of the unknown aftermath following its decision. 
No chaos would ensue. The CPD would need to establish a new set of 
“pre-established objective criteria” for its candidate selection in order 
to comply with FECA.243 In doing so, it would be able to maintain its 
first two requirements—that a client be constitutionally eligible and 
be on a number of ballots that would make it mathematically possible 
to win the Electoral College.244 These represent a candidate’s 
theoretical chance of winning, and without them, the debates could be 
open to countless participants.245 Such an overcrowded event would 
likely render it impossible to “intelligently evaluate the candidates’ 
personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues,”246 thus 
depriving the public of a key benefit of the debates. These first two 
requirements are therefore reasonable because they allow a staging 
organization to avoid this outcome.  
Additional requirements could also be added to ensure the public 
benefits from the debates. There are justifications to limit access to 
the debates beyond the first two requirements because it is reasonable 
to think that these alone would be insufficient to guarantee a 
manageable number of participants.247 And as discussed earlier, there 
are a number of available limitations that could meet these 
 
241. Id. at 284 (“If there is any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an 
inconsistency and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by the 
Congress and not by this Court.”). 
242. Id. at 282. 
243. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(c) (2012) (“For all debates, staging 
organization(s) must use pre-established objective criteria to determine 
which candidates may participate in a debate.”). 
244. See 2012 Criteria, supra note 7. 
245. See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 85–86 (noting concerns that 
relaxed standards will lead to a chaotic event and risk losing the major-
party candidates). 
246. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976)). 
247. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.  
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justifications without being unduly restrictive.248 Therefore, if a court 
rules that the current CPD requirements are unreasonable, a chaotic 
event to the detriment of the public is not likely to follow. Instead, it 
is reasonable to envision a better debate platform emerging as the 
dust settles. 
Conclusion 
Unless the CPD voluntarily revises its selection criteria, third-
party candidates are likely to continue their pursuit of the podium 
through the court system each election season. The debates have 
become essential to establishing a third-party candidate’s viability, 
and without them, the candidates are unlikely to ever reach the 
15% threshold requirement. This catch-22 leaves litigation as the most 
feasible route for seeking inclusion, despite the third-party candidates’ 
historical lack of success using this tactic. 
The Supreme Court’s sweeping statements in direct opposition to 
antitrust application in the political arena249 would probably be very 
influential in a court’s analysis. Furthermore, the Sherman Act is 
universally known as an economic doctrine.250 These considerations 
make a third-party victory under the theory seem unlikely. 
Nevertheless, a plaintiff could make credible responses to both of 
these issues. For one, the situations in Noerr-Pennington can be 
distinguished. Those facts involved political activity in the form of 
influencing official legislative action, while a third-party-inclusion suit 
would deal with seeking to obtain a position. Further, the baseball 
trilogy demonstrates the Court’s flexibility in broadening its antitrust 
application.  
If a court reaches the merits, it would need to find that the 
CPD’s selection criteria have an effect on commerce, arise out of a 
conspiracy between the Republican and Democratic National 
Committees, and constitute an unreasonable restraint of competition. 
Due in part to the candor of its founders, there is a compelling 
argument that the CPD is, in essence, a bipartisan organization; and 
due to the essential nature of the debates and the feasibility of 
alternate criteria, there also exists a compelling argument that the 
15% requirement is an unreasonable restraint. The most strained 
argument is probably showing an effect on commerce. While no 
argument is likely to win on its own, mentioning all those suggested 
 
248. See supra Part III.C.2.b (providing examples of less restrictive alternatives).  
249. See E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 
141 (1961) (noting the application of the Sherman Act is “not at all 
appropriate . . . in the political arena.”). 
250. See id. (noting that the Sherman Act is “tailored . . . for the 
business world”). 
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in this Note—the effect on salaried position involved, the corporate 
funding, and advertisements—could be persuasive to a court weighing 
the totality of circumstances. 
Also, there is evidence suggesting both a more expansive, social 
purpose of the Sherman Act and that its simplistic language was 
drafted to allow for more judicial discretion. Therefore, if a court finds 
that it could plausibly apply antitrust law, it should do so in light of 
the public policy benefits that stem from third-party inclusion. 
Despite third-party candidates’ lack of success in the courts, some 
opinions appeared reluctant to rule in favor of the CPD. Recall in 
Buchanan, the court noted that the FEC’s decision to classify the 
CPD as “nonpartisan” would unfortunately lead to “increased public 
cynicism about the integrity of our electoral system” and recognized 
the “good public policy” of allowing third-party candidates in the 
debates.251 This language may suggest that a wind of change is around 
the corner, and that a court is looking for the right moment to step 
in. Antitrust application could prove to provide that opportunity. 
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